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This paper is about business reorganisation under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In brief, I assert that Chapter 11 once was used to 
preserve the interests of equity owners, while now it is 
used to preserve the value of assets. The change is all the 
more interesting for the way it came about. It is not the 
result of any specific decision, or even any conscious shift 
of attitude. It is much more the result of a more or less 
subconscious sea change in our perception of the 
problem.
The point requires some explanation, and not only 
because I write for a non-US audience. The core problem 
is to define what we intended to be the purpose of 
Chapter 11 in the first place. And the remarkable fact is 
that we have no idea.
First, background. The Constitution provides that 
Congress shall have the power to pass bankruptcy laws. 
Congress enacted the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, 
although a predecessor extends back to 1898. The Code is 
organised into Chapters. For example, Chapter 7 provides 
for simple liquidation   the case where the residuary 
owners throw the keys on the table and the trustee 
undertakes to liquidate the assets and distribute the 
proceeds among creditors as their interests may appear.
Chapter 11 provides for 'reorganisation'. But the Code 
nowhere defines 'reorganisation'. This is noteworthy in 
itself, given the fact that the Code includes a general
' o o
catalogue of 50-odd definitions, as well as another 20 or 
30 specific definitions scattered through the Code at large. 
But the absence is probably not accidental: the likelihood 
is that the drafters knew they were leaving a critical term 
undefined, and that they intended to leave the definition 
to the genius of the common law.
o
When lawyers undertake to explain Chapter 11, they 
typically say something about how a purpose of Chapter 
11 is to 'save the business'. But there is an ambiguity here. 
When we say 'save the business', we could mean either of 
two things. We could mean, on the one hand, to preserve 
a (higher) 'going concern value' as distinct from realising 
the (lower) 'liquidation value' that creditors might accrue 
if the assets are dissipated piecemeal. Or we could mean,
on the other hand, to preserve the residual stake of the 
equity owners.
These purposes may go together, but they need not, as 
we can see from a couple of examples. Consider, first, this 
balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities & NW
$80
Total
L
NW
$100 
($20)
This is the simple case where the residuary owners   the 
equity  might as well throw the keys on the table. There 
isnn't enough to go around and there will be nothing left
O O O
for them. Contrast this case:
Assets Liabilities & NW
$80 (Liq)
$120 (GC)
Total (?)
L $100
(?)
(?)
This is the much different case in which the assets are 
worth only $80 in liquidation, but will be worth $120 in 
a going concern. The residual owners have every incentive 
to go to the creditors and say: both ends of the boat are 
sinking. Let's work together and preserve the higher going
O O I O O O
concern value. The incentive for you is that you get paid. 
The incentive for us is that we get to keep our residuary 
stake.
These first two examples are almost non-problematic. 
But now, take a more contentious case. The balance sheet 
looks like this:
Assets Liabilities & NW
$80 (Liq)
$90 (GC)
Total (?)
L $100
NW (?)
(?)
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Again, going concern value exceeds liquidation value.
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But this time, it falls short of the sum necessary to satisfy 
claims of creditors. The residual owners propose to 
'reorganise' with a new balance sheet that looks like this:
Assets Liabilities & NW
Total
$90
$90
L
NW
$85
$5
$90
The residuary owners are saying to the creditors: if we 
preserve the going concern value, the assets are worth 
$90, but you will never see any more than that. We 
propose that you accept reorganisation based on a value of 
$90, but that you leave $5 on the table for us.
One's first thought may be: why would creditors ever 
enter into a deal like this? But in fact, the deal is more 
plausible than may at first appear. Here is a typical case: 
the residual owner is also the manager of the debtor. Hiso
pitch is: you can't preserve the going concern value 
without me. This is a limited liability entity, so I can walk 
away. But I won't walk away if you accept a reduction in 
your claim and leave me with my equity stake.
So, on closer scrutiny, once again there may be a 
possibility for a deal that benefits everyone. But this fact 
suggests a provocative question. That is: if both debtors 
and creditors have incentives to make a deal, then why do 
you need Chapter 11 ? There are two answers to this 
question. The first is   maybe you don't need Chapter 11. 
Indeed, creditors and debtors do deals like this every day 
without any court intervention at all. But the second 
answer is   absent Chapter 11; there may be practical 
obstacles that prevent deals of this sort even where most 
of the creditors (and equity owners) agree.
For example, consider this balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities & NW
Total
$25 (Liq)
$40 (GC)
(?)
A
B
C
NW
$25
$25
$25
(?)
(?)
In words: the debtor owes $25 to each of three 
creditors. The assets may be worth $25 in liquidation, or 
$40 as a going concern. If creditors are to divide assets pro 
rata, then they have an incentive to protect the value of the 
going concern. But no single creditor has the same
o o o
incentive: the single creditor has the incentive to get his 
$25, even if it means destroying the going concern and 
leaving others empty-handed.
A similar problem arises when it comes time to make a 
deal. Suppose that (for whatever reason) you can't 
preserve the going-concern value unless all creditors are 
on board. Then any individual creditor has an incentive to 
hold out, and to induce other creditors to buy his 
participation by giving him a relatively larger share of the 
reorganised debtor.
Another way to make this point is to approach it as an 
aspect of the bankruptcy 'discharge'. The very notion of a 
'discharge' in a corporate bankruptcy is an oddity. After 
all, independent of bankruptcy, the corporation has its 
discharge built-in. The essence of the corporation is the 
idea of limited liability: the equity owners risk only the 
capital they invest in the firm. If there won't be enough 
left to reach them, then they effect a discharge simply by 
walking away. This isn't just an incident of the corporate 
form   rather, it is the operational definition.
But if the business will continue as a going concern, then
o o '
the problem is more complicated. Of course any 
individual creditor can agree to reduce or surrender a 
claim. But to make a deal work, you may need to get them 
all to reduce together. And any event, the parties will want 
to know just which claims are being reduced, and by how 
much.
Problems like this may be solvable when the numbers 
are small. But the more creditors, the harder it will be to 
make it happen. Indeed, just getting everybody organised, 
and gathering the necessary information about claims and 
assets, may be enough to stop any deal at the threshold. 
You find yourself aching for a mechanism that will 
facilitate deals that make sense.
Which is, of course, precisely what Chapter 11 purports 
to do. It puts structure on the case by providing for the 
scheduling of assets and claims. It imposes an automatic 
stay against unilateral creditor action. Perhaps most 
dramatic, it imposes the deal on dissenters. And it 
provides for a 'clean' discharge, that tells the world just 
which claims go away.
So to recap: on this reading, Chapter 11 functions to 
implement deals that creditors (and owners) would make 
if they could on their own. Going concern values are 
maximised. Equity owners get to retain their stakes. No 
one is hurt except the odd 'holdout', and everyone goes to 
the seashore. But this view is too benign for belief. Surely 
there must be more to it than we have seen here?
There is more. In fact, there is quite a bit about Chapter 
11 to suggest that it might function to protect equity 
owners as distinct from going concern values   or, perhaps 
more precisely, equity owners at the expense of creditors.
The point of departure for this view is a fact of life for 
insolvent debtors. The fact is: the residual equity owners 
always gain from more time. To see that this is so, 
reconsider our first balance sheet: 25
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Assets Liabilities & NW
Total
L
NW
$100
($20)
$80
But now, consider some facts that the numbers don't tell 
you. Specifically: the assets would yield $80 if liquidated 
today. If you wait for a year, they might be worth nothing 
  or they might be worth $160, with a 50 percent chance 
of each outcome. In terms of simple probabilities, this 
pencils out to a value of '.
0.5 ($0) + 0.5 ($160) = $80
... So everything seems to check. But from the standpoint 
of the creditors, it does not check. On these numbers, if 
we wait a year, then the creditors have only a 50 percent
chance of petting paid. This means that the 'weighted'o o r o
value of their claim is not $100, but just $50: 
0.5 ($0) + 0.5 ($100) = $50
Meanwhile, equity has a 50 percent chance of getting 
$ 160 (less the amount necessary to pay off debt):
0.5 ($ 0) + 0.5 ($160 - $100) = $30
So a 'revised' or 'probability-weighted' balance sheet looks 
like this:
Assets Liabilities & NW
Total
L
NW
$50 
$30 
$80
The face value of the debt remains $100, of course, but 
these probability-weighted values are the ones that traders 
will use in buying and selling the distressed debt on the
J O O
secondary market. Of course, on these numbers, no 
individual claim will ever pay off at exactly $50. But think 
of it like insurance: the insurer takes $100 from each of 
1,000 people to insure against the one-in-a-thousand risk 
of losing a $100,000 car. The insurer will pay either (a) 
nothing or (b) $100,000 - never $100, even though that 
is the 'value' of the claim.
So equity has every incentive to wait. Remarkably, 
Chapter 11 not only permits equity to wait. It actually 
mandates waiting, in that it provides for a so-called 
'exclusivity period' (typically 120 days) during which only 
the debtor (read: the equity owners of the debtor) may 
propose a plan.
To see why this is important, consider a 'plan' to dispose 
of the assets by sale distributing the assets among creditors 
as their interests may appear. Such a plan is clearly 
permissible under Chapter 11. But no equity owner will
ever propose such a plan as long as he has hope for the 
future.
The reader may object that the managers of the assets 
still have the obligation to maximise asset value   and that 
is true. The trouble is, maximising asset value may itself 
prove harmful to the creditors. To see that this is so, 
reconsider our previous example, where the liabilities 
were $100 and the quick-sale liquidation value was $80. 
We saw that the equity owners might gain (at the expense 
of the creditors) by waiting and taking a risk. Consider this 
strategy again, but this time assume that 'wait and risk' will 
yield a 50 percent chance of $220 (rather than $160) and 
(as before) a 50 percent chance of zero. Now, the 
weighted value of the assets is:
o
0.5 ($0) + 0.5 ($220) = $110.
But the weighted value of the debt remains:
o
0.5 ($0) + 0.5 ($100) = $50
Meanwhile, the weighted value of the equity becomes:
0.5 ($ 0) + 0.5 ($220 - $100) = $60
And the 'probability-weighted balance sheet' becomes:
Assets Liabilities & NW
Total
$110
$110
L
NW
$50
$60
$110
The point is that in this case, the 'asset' view and the 
'equity' view of Chapter 11 are at war with one another. 
Equity's risk-taking damages creditors even as it 
maximises asset values.
So the Code seems virtually to mandate a kind of risk- 
taking that may help to preserve the old equity stake, even 
as it damages creditors
A second rule provides even more help to old equity 
owners, even though its policy grounding is less clear. 
Recall that in an ordinary bankruptcy case, a trustee is 
appointed who takes charge of the assets and distributes 
the proceeds to creditors as their interests may appear. 
But not so in Chapter 11. In Chapter 11, the 'debtor' 
(read: the old equity owners) remains in possession unless 
the court chooses to oust them.
This is surely one of the most important features of 
Chapter 11, and perhaps one of the most misunderstood. 
The rule surely appears to favour the old equity owners, 
and in many cases it surely does so (of which more in a 
moment). But it has a dual purpose. Indeed, in many 
cases, the rule serves the interests of creditors at least as 
much as those of equity.
To see why this is so, recall that if you appoint a trustee, 
you have a new round of cost, and inefficiency as the
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trustee masters is brief. If the old equity owners are honest 
and competent (but merely unlucky), then creditors may 
well profit from leaving them in control and saving the costs.
So the Code leaves the debtor in possession  the Code 
title is 'debtor in possession', usually short-handed as 
'DIP'. This DIP has the responsibilities, as well as the 
powers, of a trustee. But no one expects the debtor in 
possession to act as adversely towards 'himself as would a 
fully independent trustee   and at any rate, he does not. 
The statute also specifies that the court can oust the 
debtor in possession at any time 'for cause'. In fact, courts 
rarely do oust the debtor in possession. It would be 
fascinating to know whether the drafters intended the
o
courts to give such leeway to the old owners, but in any 
event, they do.
Or perhaps it is better to say, 'they did'. There is 
abundant evidence to confirm that equity owners used 
Chapter 11 in the 1980s, even at the creditors' expense. 
But lately, the tide seems to be turning. More precisely, 
debtors and creditors continue to use Chapter 11. But 
they use it now in a different way. As I suggested above, 
they use it to protect asset values, independent of (or 
perhaps even at the expense of) equity owners.
I offer this as an assertion, not a demonstration. But if 
I am right, it amounts to a radical shift in perspective on 
the rule of Chapter 11. And it has occurred, as I say, 
without any conscious or formal decision. So the question 
arises   if all this is so, what could make it so? What sorts 
of changes could have led to such a shift in perspective, all 
without anyone noticing?J o
There are several possibilities. One is the unexampled 
strength of the economy. Debtors still get in trouble, of 
course   even in pood times   but the consequences areO L
not so dreadful. The unluckiest owner is likely to be able 
to find an exit strategy   a new business, or at least a new 
job, that will take the edge off his misfortune.
Closely related is a subtle but important shift in our 
conception of the rules of debt and equity. An older view 
draws a metaphysical distinction between creditors and 
holders of equity stakes. Equity stakeholders are 'the 
owners'. Creditors are 'others', whose rights have to be
' O
respected, but who remain outsiders. You can see this view- 
in the Code itself, which frequently refers to 'the debtor' 
when it seems to mean 'the majority in amount of the 
equity claims'.
A newer view eradicates this discontinuity. It treats debt 
and equity as two different kinds of contract claim. On 
this view, the asset doesn't know who owns it, and you 
can't expect to change asset values by changes on the 
credit side of the balance sheet. Equity still has a place at 
the table on this view, but it is no longer special.
A third reason why things seem to have changed is that 
creditors are wilier than they used to be. The structure of 
Chapter 11 is that it puts the aces in the equity owners'
sleeve. But creditors, after a few years of stunned 
confusion, appear to have learned how to trump the aces 
with counter-strategies of their own.
o
There is a fourth possibility, perhaps accidental, but no 
less important. It happens that there was a great personnel 
turnover among bankruptcy judges about 1984. Many of 
the judges went on the bench as fresh faces back then. 
Many of them are still there, some 17 years wiser than 
when they began. Is it possible that judges are more 
sceptical now, less tolerant of ingenious excuses, than they 
might have been a decade ago?
If it is true that Chapter 11 has lost its role as a device 
for the protection of equity, then what is its role today? 
The answer is that it offers all the advantages that we saw
o
in our preliminary sketch at the beginning of this essay. Go 
back to our earlier example that looked like this:
Assets Eiabilities & NW
$80 (Eiq)
$90(GC)
Total (?)
E $100
NW (?)
(?)
Earlier we saw how equity owners might try to use 
bargaining skill plus an appeal to self-interest in trying to 
retain a slice of a going concern for themselves. But it
o o
doesn't have to work that way. Here, creditors have an 
interest in preserving the going-concern value even if the 
equity is wiped out. The simplest way is simply to cancel 
all the old interests and create a new balance sheet:
Assets Eiabilities & NW
$90 (GC)
$90(GC)
Total $90
E $0
NW $90
$90
The 'old' claims are gone (along with the old equity), 
and the 'new' equity belongs to the 'old' creditors. Think 
of it as a sale of the business to the creditors. A close 
variant is simply to sell the assets as a going concern to a 
stranger, and then distribute the proceeds among creditors 
(sic   not equity) as their interests may appear.
Can Chapter 11 help in this situation? It can prevent 
piecemeal foreclosure. It can stifle (or at least tame) 
potential holdouts. It can give a kind of closure to a 
proposal for a global settlement of debts. In short, it can 
do just about everything it may have been designed to do 
in the first place   unless, of course, it was designed to 
serve the interests of the old equity owners. &
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